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FEDERAL MARITAL PRIVILEGES IN A CRIMINAL
CONTEXT: THE NEED FOR FURTHER MODIFICATION
SINCE TRAMMEL
The defendant's privilege to prevent admission of his or her spouse's
testimony at trial has existed in one form or another for roughly 400 years.'
Not until the twentieth century, however, have the marital privileges under-
gone major modifications and faced the possibility of abolition. 2 The adverse
spousal testimony privilege and the confidential communications privilege
constitute the marital privileges. The adverse spousal testimony privilege
prevents the admission into evidence of a spouse's testimony that tends to
incriminate a defendant spouse.' The confidential communications privilege
excludes from evidence private marital communications between spouses.
4
Exceptions to the privileges have developed begrudgingly and reluctantly.5
1. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980); "Lempert, "Mason Ladd
Lecture" A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 725, 726 (1981); Comment,
The Spousal Testimonial Privilege After Trammel v. United States, 58 DEN. L. J. 357, 369
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Privilege After Trammell.
2. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44-45.
3. Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern
World, 7 CuM. L. REV. 307, 309 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Medieval Philosophy]. Courts
sometimes referred to the adverse spousal testimony privilege as the antimarital facts privilege.
See United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978) (antimarital facts terminology is
another name for adverse spousal testimony privilege); Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy
Workshop: Privileges-Husband and Wife; Identity of Informer, 20 CRIu. L. BuLL. 34, 36
(1984) (antimarital facts equals adverse spousal testimony).
4. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S.
7, 14 (1934); see United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.) (confidential marital
communications pertained to post arrest communications concerning conspiracy), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); see also United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.) (marital
communications made in confidence protected by confidential communications privilege), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 196 (1984); United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983)
(confidential communications privilege applies to communication intended to be confidential);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.) (confidential communications privilege
applies only to conversations intended to be confidential), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
5. Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3, at 312-13. At common law, the only exception to
the marital privileges was extreme necessity. Id. Common-law courts invoked the necessity
exception to admit a victim spouse's testimony and to avoid an injustice to the victim spouse.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2239 at 242 (1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Stein v. Bowman,
13 Pet. 209, 221 (1829). The justification for preventing the admission of a spouse's testimony
was to protect a marriage. WIGMORE, supra, at 243; United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166,
1169 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). If a spouse committed a
crime against his or her spouse, however, courts presumed the marriage unworthy of protection.
Woioica, supra, at 243.
At present, courts invoke an exception to the marital privileges when a spouse commits a
crime against the other spouse. See WIGMoRE, supra, at 243-50 (crimes against spouses triggering
exception to marital privileges include assault, attempt to kill, rape, incest, and bigamy); see
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Federal courts created the joint participation exception to the marital privi-
leges as one way to admit spousal testimony into evidence. 6 The joint
participation exception prevents the silencing of a spouse's testimony through
invocation of the marital privileges if the testifying spouse participated in a
joint criminal venture with the defendant spouse.'
In Trammel v. United States," the United States Supreme Court signifi-
cantly modified the marital privileges. 9 Trammel, marking the Court's latest
alteration of the privileges, clarified the application of the marital privileges
and the joint participation exception. 10 Prior to Trammel, both the defendant
also United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975) (offense against child of either
spouse is detrimental to familial harmony and warrants exception to marital privileges).
Appellate courts unanimously apply an exception to the marital privileges in a Mann Act
prosecution in which the defendant is accused of prostituting his wife. See Wyatt, 362 U.S. at
525-26 (Court rejected privilege to hush testimony of wife where she was victim of crime);
Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2141 (1982) (prohibits interstate transportation of female for purpose
of prostitution or some other immoral purpose). Federal courts also allow an exception to the
confidential communications privilege when a third party overhears the marital communications
since the communications are not then confidential as between the spouses. See United States
v. AFcher, 733 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.) (out of court statements by one spouse and testified to
by third party against other spouse not protected by marital privileges), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
196 (1984); United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir.) (phone conversation between
both spouses and third party admitted into evidence), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 180 (1983);
Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3, at 311 (confidential communications privilege does not
apply when third party is known to be present during marital conversation). The marital
communications must be out of the hearing of third parties and must remain undisclosed in
order to be privileged. Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3, at 313-14; see also United States v.
Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 947 (D. Colo. 1982) (presence of third party during marital communi-
cation is not exception to confidential communications privilege when one spouse was unaware
of presence of third party), rev'd on other grounds, 743 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1848 (1985).
6. Comment, The Deconstruction of the Marital Privilege, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 723,
751 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Deconstruction]; see infra text accompanying note 7 (definition
of joint participation exception).
7. United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1984). See generally, United States
v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961 (2d Cir.
1926). Judge Learned Hand explained that where two people comprise a joint criminal venture,
they form a partnership in crime. See Van Riper, 13 F.2d at 967. Judge Hand treated the two
joint participants as one, and thus allowed the defendant's statements against the other joint
venturer into evidence since, in effect, the court admitted the declarant's statements against the
declarant himself. See id. In both Van Riper and Pugliese, Judge Hand employed the language
of common-law incompetency in allowing the admission of a joint participant's statements
against the copartner. See Van Riper, 13 F.2d at 967; Pugliese, 153 F.2d at 500. The common
law treated husband and wife as one entity and disallowed one's testimony for or against the
other. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussion of common-law incompetency).
Judge Hand treated codefendants as one entity, as a partnership; but in contrast to the common-
law treatment of the husband-wife entity, Judge Hand allowed one codefendant to testify
adversely against the other. Van Riper, 13 F.2d at 967; see infra text accompanying notes 21-
24 (discussion of common law incompetency).
8. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
9. Id. at 53; see infra text accompanying notes 84-94 (discussing Trammel modification
of marital privilege).




spouse and the witness spouse could assert the adverse spousal testimony
privilege." The Trammel Court, however, revoked the testimonial privilege
from the defendant spouse, leaving the testimonial privilege vested only in
the witness spouse. 2 The Trammel Court, however, noted that courts should
not compel the witness spouse to testify.'3 The admission of adverse spousal
testimony at trial, therefore, may be contingent upon the voluntariness of
the testimony.' 4 Since Trammel discouraged compelling an intransigent wit-
ness spouse to testify, the joint participation exception has a limited function
as to adverse spousal testimony.' 5 The witness spouse, therefore, will either
voluntarily testify as provided by Trammel or assert the adverse spousal
testimony privilege.' 6 Nevertheless, when no harmony remains in a marriage,
compulsion of adverse spousal testimony is justified; and courts should apply
the joint participation exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege
when spouses jointly participate in a crime and the witness spouse refuses to
testify. Some courts still apply the joint participation exception to the
confidential communications privilege. 7 Various federal circuit courts, how-
11. See Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3, at 311 (Trammel modified earlier law). Before
Trammel, spouses could not testify against one another. See Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74, 75 (1958) (husband and wife incompetent to testify for or against one another at
common law).
12. 445 U.S. at 53; see infra text accompanying notes 84-94 (discussion of reasons for
Trammel modification).
13. 445 U.S. at 53; WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d § 405,
435 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. But see infra text accompanying notes 165-68 (courts
should implement joint participation exception and thus compel some involuntary testimony).
14. See United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 642 (10th Cir. 1982) (witness spouse
must knowingly and intelligently waive privilege not to testify against defendant spouse); Appeal
of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (waiver of adverse spousal testimony privilege
must be intelligent and knowing); Galban, Evidence, 1983 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 175, 189 (courts
must determine if witness spouse's testimony is voluntary). To insure the voluntariness of a
witness spouse's testimony, one commentator suggested that courts should make an independent
determination whether witness spouse's testimony is voluntary, that courts should make deter-
minations of voluntariness in camera at trial, and that courts should allowneither prosecution
nor defendant to make statements in the presence of the jury concerning the adverse spousal
testimony privilege. See Privilege After Trammel, supra note 1, at 368.
15. See Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 752 (post-Trammel, question is whether testimony
is voluntary, not whether involuntary testimony is admissible). But see infra text accompanying
note 168 (discussion of function of joint participation exception to testimonial privilege).
16. See Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 751 (joint participation exception as applied to
adverse spousal testimony privilege engulfed by Trammel ruling); M. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTI-
MONIAL PRIVILEGES § 4.02, 4.12-4.12.1 (1985) (application of joint participation question to
adverse spousal testimony privilege is moot issue after Trammel).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1985) (neither marital
privilege applies when spouses are joint criminal participants); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d
1239, 1243 (6th Cir.) (applying joint participation exception to communications privilege when
marital conversations pertain to criminal activity); cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533 (1985); United
States v. Chagra, 754 F.2d 1181, 1182 (5th Cir.) (conversations in course of conspiracy not pro-
tected under marital privileges) cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 255 (1985); United States v. Harrelson,
754 F.2d 1153, 1167-68 (5th Cir.) (joint participation exception allowed admission of statements
concerning crimes overheard through wiretap); cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 599 (1985); United States
v. Kapnison, 743 F.2d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir.) (used Judge Hand's phrase "partnership in crime"
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ever, have examined the joint participation exception regarding the confiden-
tial communications privilege and have come to differing conclusions as to
the continued validity of the exception. 8
The marital privileges originated in the late sixteenth century, 9 and by
the end of the seventeenth century most courts recognized the privileges in
both civil and criminal cases.20 By the 1600's, the marital privileges appeared
in the forms of incompetency and marital disqualification. 2' Courts often
confused incompetency and marital disqualification in application, but the
two forms were separate and distinct. 22 Marital disqualification was similar
to describe spouses engaged in criminal conspiracy and applied crime fraud exception to con-
fidential communications privilege), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2017 (1985); United States v. Broome
732 F.2d 363, 365 (4th Cir.) (marital communications concerning illegal activity do not fall within
protection of confidential communications privilege), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984); United
States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.) (joint participation exception applied against con-
fidential communications privilege in allowing into admission voluntary testimony of witness spouse),
cert. denied sub nom. Stillman v. United States 464 U.S. 936 (1983); United States v. Price,
577 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1978) (statements concerning conspiracy by joint participant spouses
not protected by marital privileges), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979); United States v. Petty,
602 F. Supp. 996, 998 (D. Wyo. 1984) (joint participation exception applicable to confidential
communications privilege when married couple engaged in criminal activity together); United States
v. Shipp, 578 F. Supp. 980, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (marital conversation concerning conspiracy
intercepted by wiretap not protected by marital privileges), aff'd, 754 F.2d 1427 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3482 (1985).
18. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (courts applying joint participation exception
to confidential communications privilege). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States,
755 F.2d 1022, 1027 (2d Cir.) (refused to grant joint participation exception to either marital
privilege), vacated as moot, United States v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986)
(No. 84-1922); Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980) (disallowing joint par-
ticipation exception to adverse spousal testimony privilege); United States v. Geller, 560 F. Supp.
1309, 1326-27 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (court disallowed admission of tapes of spouse's conversations,
reasoning confidential communications privilege protects recordings of private marital conversa-
tions), aff'd mem., 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 786 (1985); see infra
text accompanying notes 107-17 and 136-43 (discussion and analysis of Grand Jury Subpoena
and Malfitano). Only the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit fails to invoke
the joint participation exception against the confidential communications privilege. See Grand
Jury Subpoena, 755 F.2d at 1027 (finding no compelling reason to create joint participation ex-
ception to marital privileges). Both the Second and Third Circuits have refused to apply the joint
participation exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege. See id.; Malfitano, 633 F.2d
at 278 (finding that criminal marriages not necessarily beyond salvation). The Second Circuit
stated that courts allowing the joint participation exception still do not force the witness spouse
to testify. Grand Jury Subpoena, 755 F.2d at 1027.
19. Lempert, supra note 1, at 726.
20. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 2227, 213. The marital privilege first appeared in the
English case of Bent v. Allot in which an accused husband prevented his wife from testifying
against him. See Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580); WIGMORE, supra § 2227 at 211 n.l;
Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1353, 1362-63 (1973);
Privilege After Trammel, supra note 1, at 358.
21. Reutlinger, supra note 20, at 1362-63; see infra text accompanying notes 22-28
(discussion of incompetency and disqualification).
22. Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3, at 309.
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to the common-law precept that disallowed a party from testifying in any
fashion in a case in which the party had an interest. 23 The common-law
rationale for spousal incompetency was that husband and wife were one
entity and that no one should testify for himself owing to the temptation to
lie in favor of one's interest.
24
The adverse spousal testimony privilege is related closely to common-
law disqualification, 2 while the confidential communications privilege is
related to common-law incompetency. In the early stages of the evolution of
the marital privileges, the adverse spousal testimony privilege pertained to
all testimony that a spouse might present for or against the spouse's mate.
26
Like common-law disqualification, the justification for the adverse spousal
testimony privilege was that courts disqualified a party's testimony in a case
in which the party had an interest. 27 Similarly, since the common law treated
husband and wife as one entity, courts considered the spouses incompetent
to testify for or against one another.28
23. Haney, The Evolutionary Development of Marital Privileges in Federal Criminal
Trials: Constricting the Invocation and Growth of Spousal Privileges in Federal Criminal Cases
by Interpreting the Common Law in the "Light of Reason and Experience," 6 NAT. J. CRim.
DEF. 99, 122 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Development of Marital Privileges]. The common law
prevented a litigant from testifying in a case in which the litigant held a pecuniary interest since
that interest might make the litigant's testimony unduly prejudiced in favor of the litigant's
case. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (accused not allowed to testify at
common law in case in which accused's self-interest may result in perjury).
24. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (common-law fiction did not
recognize legal existence of women); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958) (common
law considered husband and wife as one unit and disallowed spousal testimony since self-interest
might persuade spouse to lie); see also Galban, supra note 14, at 187 n.77 (married couples
considered one entity at common law); Lempert, supra note 1, at 726 n.8 (husband and wife
were one at common law); Note, The Husband- Wife Testimonial Privilege in the Federal Courts,
59 B.U.L. REV. 894, 896 (1979) (rule of incompetency founded on common-law fiction of
husband and wife as one flesh) [hereinafter cited as Testimonial Privilege]; Note, Interspousal
Immunity: What Price Marital Harmony?, 19 FoRuM 500 (1984) (husband and wife were one
at common law and no one should testify on his own behalf, and courts cannot force one to
testify against himself) [hereinafter cited as Interspousal Immunity]; Medieval Philosophy, supra
note 3, at 108 (incompetency initially founded on Lord Coke's metaphysical assumption that
husband and wife were one); Privilege After Trammel, supra note 1 at 358 (husband and wife
considered one person and thus spousal testimony not considered trustworthy since no one is
likely to testify against himself). Women achieved a separate legal existence only in the late
nineteenth century. Interspousal Immunity, supra at 500-01. Furthermore, Congress passed
legislation in 1878 that abolished disqualification and permitted criminal defendants to testify
on their own behalf. Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 108.
25. But see Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 729 (adverse spousal testimony privilege
based on common-law incompetency until Trammel left adverse spousal testimony privilege
vested only in witness spouse); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (Supreme
Court vested testimonial privilege in witness spouse).
26. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 373 (1933) (in early development of marital
privileges, spouses could not testify for or against one another).
27. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3 at 309.
28. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; see supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussion of
common-law treatment of husband and wife as one entity).
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In the common-law development of the privileges, the communications
privilege at first was not distinct from the adverse spousal testimony privi-
lege. 29 Currently, however, the adverse spousal testimony privilege is available
to the witness spouse as long as he or she remains married to the defendant,
while the confidential communications privilege is continuously available to
both spouses even after divorce or separation of the spouses so long as the
spouses engaged in the conversation during the marriage. 30 Only the spouse
making the confidential communication may invoke the confidential com-
munications privilege,3' whereas only the witness spouse may elect to assert
the adverse spousal testimony privilege.12 In fact, a witness spouse may now
offer adverse testimony at trial over the objection of the defendant spouse. 3
In contrast, a defendant spouse may prevent the admission of the voluntary
testimony of his or her spouse if the testimony pertains to the defendant's
confidential marital communications. 34 Courts generally have applied the
confidential communications privilege to spoken words or written ex-
changes,35 but some courts extend the privilege to acts performed privately
by a spouse in the presence of the other spouse.3 6 Courts presume the private
communications between spouses to be confidential and thus within the
ambit of the communications privilege unless contrarily proved.
7
29. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 2333, 644.
30. United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978); WRIGHT, supra note 13, §
406, 438. The marital relationship at the time to which the adverse testimony relates is of no
consequence. WRIHT, supra note 13, at § 406, 438. But see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 86 at
202-03 (3d ed. 1984) (courts should not allow communications privilege after death of one
spouse or divorce since revelation of communication no longer affects marriage).
31. WIGMoRE, supra note 5, at § 2340, 670; see MCCORMICK, supra note 30, at § 83, 198
(communicator holds confidential communications privilege but often, conversations entail
confidences disclosed by both spouses, making privilege available to both spouses); C. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 567, 99 (13th ed. 1973) (confidential communications privilege
only available to spouse against whom communications offered as testimony); LARKIN, supra
note 16 at § 4.03, 4.27 (usually, only spouse making confidential communication entitled to
assert privilege); Krattenmaker, Interspousal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 64 GEo. L. J. 613, 664 (1976) (communications privilege should be vested only in
one who utters confidential statement). But see Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3, at 30 (either
spouse may assert confidential communications privilege).
32. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980); see supra text accompanying note
12 (Trammel Court vested adverse spousal testimony privilege in witness spouse only).
33. Purdy, The Marital Privilege: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 309,
310-11 (1982).
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (private marital communications protected
from revelation at trial by communications privilege).
35. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1953) (confidential communications
privilege applies to utterances, not acts); United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1452 (9th
Cir. 1983) (confidential communications privilege applies to "utterances or expressions); United
States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d at 1318 (same); United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892, 894 (6th
Cir. (same), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 180 (1983).
36. MCCORMICK, supra note 30, at § 79, 164; WHARTON'S, supra note 31, at § 568, 101;
see United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 396 n.6 (8th Cir.) (spousal communications not
restricted to speech and writings), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
37. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934); see In re Grand Jury Investigation,
603 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1979) (government must overcome presumption of confidentiality
[Vol. 43:197
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The rationale for the adverse spousal testimony privilege existed in two
forms-avoidance of marital dissension and the fostering of family harmony,
and a natural repugnance for the idea of possibly condemning a person with
the testimony of his spouse.18 The prevailing rationale supporting the confi-
dential communications privilege was preserving the intimacy of marital
privacy.3 9 Implicit in the underlying policy supporting the confidential com-
munications privilege was the importance of successful marriages to public
welfare. 40
Despite the popularity of the confidential communications privilege
in federal courts, the United States Supreme Court approved Proposed
Rule of Evidence 505, which omitted the confidential communications
privilege altogether.4' Congress, however,enacted Federal Rule of Evidence
in order to admit marital communications into evidence); WRIGHT, supra note 19, at § 406,
438-39 (marital communication presumed confidential until shown otherwise); Galban, supra
note 18, at 192 (confidential communications privilege not applied if there is no expectation of
privacy in marital communication).
38. Testimonial Privilege, supra note 24, at 896-97; see J. MAGUIRE EVIDENCE: COMMON
SENsE AND COMMON LAW 91 (1947) (rationale for adverse spousal testimony is family harmony);
Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 104, 122-23 (domestic or family harmony
rationale for adverse spousal testimony privilege is most popular, but less often cited policy is
natural repugnance); Haney, Spousal Testimonial Privilege in Federal Criminal Trials: Con-
stricting the Growth of Marital Privileges by Interpretation in the "Light of Reason and
Experience", 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 231, 270 (1980) (policy of adverse spousal testimony privilege
is to inculcate family harmony to benefit of spouses, children and public in general) [hereinafter
cited as Spousal Testimonial Privileges]; Medieval Philosophy, supra note 3, at 310 (policy of
adverse spousal testimony privilege based on natural repugnance of condemning man through
testimony of wife). Privilege After Trammel, supra note 1, at 359 (adverse spousal testimony
rationale is natural repugnance and Coke's idea of fostering family harmony and preventing
marital dissension); see also United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (modern
justification of adverse spousal testimony privilege is promoting family harmony); Untied States
v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1984) (adverse spousal testimony privilege protects marriage
from impact of testimony); Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 1980) (principal
modern justification of adverse spousal testimony privilege is prevention of marital dissension).
Wigmore coined the phrase "natural repugnance." WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 227, 212.
Wigmore described the familial structure at the time of the emergence of the marital privileges
as hierarchical. Id. The head of the household wielded absolute authority over his dwelling,
and those living under his domain usually depended upon him for sustenance. Id. The law
eschewed the idea of an underling condemning his revered master. Id. Furthermore, in a time
when all felonies were punishable by death, the law would not sanction a wife's testimony
against her husband, possibly condemning him to death. Id. See Lempert, supra note 1, at 729
(in seventeenth century, all felonies punishable by death).
39. See MAGUIRE, supra note 38, at 85 (cannot have successful marriages if spouses do
not trust one another); Spousal Testimonial Privileges, supra note 38, at 235-36 (confidential
communications privilege not only preserves marital harmony as does adverse spousal testimony
privilege, but also preserves marital trust); Privilege After Trammel, supra note 1, at 358-59
(policy underlying confidential communications privilege is promotion of trust and confidence
between spouses). The confidential communications privilege did not appear until the abolition
of incompetency which originally sufficed as the communications privilege. Privilege After
Trammel, supra note 1, 358-59.
40. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (marital harmony benefits public).
41. Testimonial Privilege, supra note 24, at 901 n.58; Comment, Evidence-The Privilege
Against Adverse Spousal Testimony Extended to Include Indirect Implications, 13 MEm. ST. U.
19861
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501,42 which does not recognize a marital privilege rule per se. 43 While Rule
501 does not codify the marital privileges, Rule 501 does allow federal courts
to apply the privileges as the privileges exist at common law and to develop
the evidentiary privileges as changing circumstances warrant.4
In addition to attempting to mold the marital privileges through legisla-
tive work, the United States Supreme Court continued to develop and modify
the marital privileges in a number of cases. In Funk v. United States,45 the
United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling that considered
an individual incompetent to testify on the behalf of the individual's spouse.46
The Funk Court, therefore, abolished the longstanding common-law doctrine
L. REv. 123, 127 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Adverse Spousal Testimony]; see Proposed FED.
R. Evm. 505 advisory committee note (marital conduct not affected by confidential privilege
because couple probably unaware of existence of privilege. Proposed Rule 505 vested the adverse
spousal privilege in both spouses, but omitted the confidential communications privilege.
Proposed FED. R. EVID. 505. The Supreme Court in Trammel effectively abrogated Rule 505
by vesting the adverse spousal testimony privilege in the witness spouse only. Trammel, 445
U.S. at 53.
42. FED. R. Evm. 501; see H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 40, 891
(1974) (Congress enacted Rule 501); see also Wiasorr, supra note 30, at § 406, 438 n.12 (criticism
of omission of confidential communications privilege from Proposed Rule 505); Spousal
Testimonial Privilege, supra note 38, at 295 (Congress quieted the furor over Supreme Court's
proposed rules by enacting Rule 501). The Proposed Rules of Evidence sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court caused a controversy among commentators. Privilege After Trammel,
supra note 1, at 361 (proposed rules caused a "tremendous furor" among commentators since
courts widely accepted confidential communications privilege). In 1940, Congress enacted
legislation that permitted the Supreme Court to submit proposed evidentiary rules for criminal
cases to Congress for approval. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982) (legislation allowing Court to
promulgate evidentiary rule); Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 113. Congress
also authorized Chief Justice Warren to form an advisory committee to study the use of uniform
rules of evidence in federal courts. Id. at 113-14; S. REP. No. 1277 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7058.
43. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee note; United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d
1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 50 (1980).
44. FED. R. Evto. 501 advisory committee note; Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 n.8; see S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7058
(federal courts to apply testimonial privileges using reason and experience); H.R. 5463, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CoNG. REc. 40, 891 (1974) (federal courts to develop law of privilege on
a case-by-case basis according to reason and experience); see also infra text accompanying notes
67-74 (Supreme Court based common law development of marital privileges on "reason and
experience"). Congress also fashioned Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
according to the Supreme Court's language in Funk v. United States and Woifle v. United
States. Funk, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Wo/f/e, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). Development of Marital Privileges,
supra note 23, at 898. Rule 26 reads:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the federal Rules of
Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 26. Rule 501 adopted the "reason and experience" standard from Rule 26.
FED. R. Evm. 501 advisory committee note.
45. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
46. Id. at 387.
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that prevented a witness spouse from testifying for his spouse.4 7 In Funk,
the defendant sought to admit on his behalf the testimony of defendant's
wife in an effort to reverse the defendant's conviction for conspiring to
violate a prohibition law.48 The Supreme Court in Funk asserted that even
if Congress passed no applicable legislation, the Court could repeal any
common-law rule by using the criteria of "reason and experience. ' 49 The
Court reasoned that the function of all rules of evidence is the ascertainment
of the truth and that the common law is not static, but molds itself to
changing circumstances. 50 Courts, therefore, should make continual deter-
minations as to whether an evidentiary privilege still serves the policy which
underlies the privilege.5 ' The Funk Court noted that justifications for the
marital privileges change with time and with society's changing needs . 2 The
Funk Court stated that the law of the marital privileges, therefore, mnust
change if the rationale underlying the privileges changes.53 Furthermore, the
Court in Funk explained that changes in evidentiary law should be premised
on reason and on the continually enlightening educational device of experi-
ence.5 4 Funk thus commenced an ongoing analysis to test the viability of the
marital privileges.
The United States Supreme Court in Wolfle v. United States, 55 reaffirmed
the Funk ruling, holding that federal courts should interpret common-law
evidentiary principles in the "light of reason and experience. ' 56 The Wolfle
Court dealt solely with the confidential communications privilege. 7 The
principal issue before the Supreme Court in Wolfle was the admissibility of
a statement in a letter from a husband to his wife. 8 The accused husband
asserted the confidential communications privilege in order to prevent ad-
mission of the incriminating statement into court.5 9 The Supreme Court noted
that courts presume that spouses intend private marital communications ta
be confidential. 6° The Court, however, did not honor the communications
47. Id.; see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussion of common-law dis-
qualification and incompetency).
48. Funk, 290 U.S. at 373.
49. Id. at 381-83. The United States Supreme Court in Funk v. United States held that
unless Congress acts otherwise, the common law governs the rules of evidence in criminal cases
and that the Supreme Court may interpret the common law. Id. at 379.
50. Id. at 381-83; see Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 162 (Federal
Rules of Evidence not immutable or concrete, but are flexible).
51. Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 162.
52. Funk, 290 U.S. at 385.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 381 (experience is the best teacher).
55. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
56. Id. at 12; Funk, 240 U.S. at 381; see supra text accompanying note 54 (discussion of
"reason and experience").
57. Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14.
58. Id. at 12.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 14.
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privilege since the prosecution offered the statement through the testimony
of the accused's stenographer who dictated the letter.6' The Wolfle Court
observed that the confidential communications privilege protected marital
confidences essential to the preservation of the marriage.62 Nevertheless, the
Court in Wolfle explained that marital communications made in the presence
of third parties are not privileged since the communications are not consid-
ered confidential. 63 Since the communication transpired in the presence of
the stenographer, the communication was not confidential, and the Court
allowed the admission of the stenographer's testimony.
64
The United States Supreme Court again dealt with the confidential
communications privilege in Blau v. United States.6 In Blau, the accused
husband asserted the communications privilege in declining to testify as to
the whereabouts of his wife whom the lower court wanted for questioning
before a grand jury investigating the husband's activities in the Communist
Party of Colorado. 66 The Blau Court reasoned that the husband obtained
knowledge of his wife's location through marital communications. 67 Further-
more, the Supreme Court noted that courts presume the confidentiality of
private marital communications. 68 Since the government failed to rebut the
presumption of confidentiality, the Blau Court honored the confidential
communications privilege by refusing to compel the witness husband to
testify. 69
In Hawkins v. United States,7 0 the United States Supreme Court slowed
the development of the marital privileges by upholding the imposition of the
adverse spousal testimony privilege in a Mann Act prosecution in which the
prosecution charged defendant with prostituting his wife.7' The Hawkins
decision reiterated the Funk and Wolfle holdings which held that the criteria
61. Id. at 16-17.
62. Id. at 14.
63. See id. at 17 (marital communications made in presence of mature children or other
members of nuclear family are not privileged); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text
(discussion of third party exception).
64. Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 17. The United States Supreme Court in Wolfle v. United States,
however, did not rule on whether the wife's testimony would have been privileged. Id.
65. 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
66. Id. at 333.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see supra note 37 and accompanying text (courts presume confidentiality of
spousal communications).
69. Blau, 340 U.S. at 333-34; see Note, Partners in Crime: An Examination of the
Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony, 22 J. F m. L. 713, 723 (1983-84) (Trammel did
not affect law in Blau since marital communications are still presumed confidential) [hereinafter
cited as Partners in Crime].
70. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
71. Id. at 81; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (while Hawkins prevented victim
-spouse from testifying against defendant's spouse, all appellate courts now apply an exception
to adverse spousal testimony rule in Mann Act case); Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1982)
(prohibits interstate transportation of females for prostitution).
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of "reason and experience" controlled the evolution of the marital privi-
leges.72 The Hawkins Court found that the common-law justification for the
adverse spousal testimony privilege of fostering family harmony was still
viable.7 The Court in Hawkins refused to abolish or modify the adverse
spousal testimony privilege.7 4 While the Hawkins Court did not advance the
development of the marital privileges, the Court did not stifle the evolution
of the marital privileges but left the privileges susceptible to change should
the Court decide to abolish or modify the adverse spousal testimony privilege
in the future.7
The United States Supreme Court modified the adverse spousal testimony
privilege according to "reason and experience" in Trammel v. United States.
7 6
In Trammel, the Government indicted defendant Otis Trammel for importing
heroin and for conspiring to import heroin. 77 The Government agreed not to
prosecute Trammel's wife if she testified against Trammel.7 1 Mrs. Trammel
testified, 79 and defendant Trammel asserted the adverse spousal testimony
72. See Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 79 (changes in evidentiary rules premised on "reason and
experience"); supra text accompanying notes 54 and 56 (Supreme Court mandates that "reason
and experience" are guiding criteria for development of marital privileges).
73. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77.
74. Id. at 79.
75. See id. (privileges left open to change); see also Development of Marital Privileges.
supra note 23, at 111-12 (Hawkins stated ongoing evolution of marital privileges subject to
"reason and experience").
76. 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). In Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Trammel v. United
States, Stewart agreed with the majority's modification of the hdverse spousal testimony
privilege, but Stewart claimed that "reason and experience" was not the basis of the Court's
holding. Id. at 53 (Stewart, J., concurring). Stewart believed circumstances had not changed
that dramatically since the Hawkins decision in 1958. Id. at 54. Justice Stewart argued that the
Court in Trammel simply accepted the government's arguments from 1958. Id. In 1958, the
government asked the Court to construe the adverse spousal testimony privilege to allow a
witness spouse to testify voluntarily. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77; see Privilege After Trammel,
supra note 1, at 377 (Stewart stated correctly that Court should not base justification of
Trammel on "reason and experience" or changing circumstances since circumstances did not
substantially change in short time from 1958 to 1980). Stewart believed that Hawkins did not
provide a factual setting conducive to the evolutionary development of the adverse spousal
privilege. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 82 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42.
78. See id. at 42-43 (Mrs. Trammel was unindicted coconspirator).
79. See id. at 53 (fact that Trammel's wife opted to testify against Trammel after being
immunized from prosecution does not mean Court compelled Trammel's wife to testify); see
also United States v. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441, 1444.45 (10th Cir. 1984) (grant of immunity to
witness spouse did not render spouse's" testimony involuntary nor inadmissible regarding
confidential marital communications); cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1848 (1985); Reutlinger, supra
note 20, at 1384 (witness spouse is only spouse able to determine worth of spouse's marriage
since accused probably will not be able to overcome personal bias owing to accused's interest
in case); Privilege After Trammel, supra note 1, at 367 (witness spouse in better position to
determine worth of spouse's marriage because of defendant spouse's bias). But see Lempert,
supra note 1, at 734 (Trammel decided wrongly because Court gave government incentive to
turn spouses against one another); United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (10th Cir.
1978) (McKay, J., dissenting) (law should not give incentive to witness spouse to testify against
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privilege.80 The district court denied Trammel's claim to the adverse spousal
testimony privilege, but did not allow into admission testimony concerning
confidential communications between Trammel and his wife.s ' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invoked the joint participation
exception against the adverse spousal testimony privilege to admit Mrs.
Trammel's testimony.12 The United States Supreme Court, however, con-
cluded that "reason and experience" no longer justified a defendant's
privilege to bar the voluntary adverse testimony of the defendant's spouse.83
The Trammel Court, therefore, limited the application of the joint partici-
pation exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege by vesting the
right to claim the adverse spousal testimony privilege in the witness spouse
only.
4
In addressing the adverse spousal testimony privilege, the Trammel Court
examined the Hawkins decision and noted that Hawkins set no absolute
doctrine governing the marital privilege, but rather left open the possibility
of change. 5 In Hawkins, the Court refused to abrogate or modify the adverse
spousal testimony privilege because the privilege culminated centuries of
common-law evolution.8 6 The Supreme Court in Trammel, however, dis-
cerned a trend in state law to revoke from the accused the privilege to
defendant spouse and thus rupture marital harmony) (citing Hawkins v. United States, 445 U.S.
74, 77 (1958)), aff'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); supra note 14 and accompanying
text (discussion of voluntariness of witness spouse's testimony). The Supreme Court in Trammel
stated that allowing the accused the privilege to bar the adverse testimony of the accused's
spouse might undermine the marital relationship. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52. The Trammel Court
explained that the Goverment might not offer immunity to a spouse if the Government knows
that the accused will exercise the privilege to prevent the spouse from testifying. Id. This twist
in logic, if not specious, is irrelevant. The accused's indirect eradication of his spouse's initial
acquittal through immunity will not likely further damage a marriage if, as the Trammel Court
itself stated, the accused's spouse is willing to help put the accused in jail to begin with. Id.
The Trammel Court, however, effectively pointed out that Hawkins does not prevent the
Government from soliciting a spouse for inculpating evidence. Trammel, 45 U.S. at 52 n.12;
see United States v. Burton, 631 F.2d 280, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) (marital privileges do not preclude
government from obtaining information from one spouse in order to apprehend other spouse).
The Trammel Court reasoned that only the testimony at trial is important. Trammel, 445 U.S.
at 52 n. 12.
80. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43.
81. Id.; United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1167 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
82. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1169.
83. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
84. Id.; see Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 143 (Trammel left
adverse spousal testimony privileges with witness spouse only). Trammel conceded the efficacy
of the adverse spousal testimony privilege rationale as set forth in Hawkins. Id. The Trammel
Court acknowledged that the testimonial privilege preserved marital harmony. Id. Nevertheless,
the Court modified the privilege and concluded that vesting the adverse spousal testimony
privilege in the witness spouse alone still helped foster marital tranquility without making a
spouse's testimony unobtainable. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
85. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46.
86. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958).
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prevent the accused's spouse from testifying against the accused.87 Further-
more, the Court in Trammel noted that Congress did not intend to stifle the
development of the marital privileges in passing Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 8 The Court stated that Congress' purpose was to provide
a flexible set of evidentiary rules.8 9 In addition, the Trammel Court explained
that the goal of the adversarial system is the ascertainment of truth and that
ordinarily a court has the right to hear all evidence.90 The Court stated that
courts should construe the testimonial privileges narrowly and strictly since
testimonial privileges prevent the admission of evidence and consequently
burden the quest for truth.9' Furthermore, the Court in Trammel reasoned
87. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 49-50 (law of domestic relations reserved for states);
Galban, supra note 14, at 187 (Trammel recognized movement in state law to revoke adverse
spousal testimony privilege from accused); see also Development of Marital Privileges, supra
note 23, at 146 (Trammel decision influenced heavily by ambivalence of federal courts towards
adverse spousal testimony privilege). In the Fourth Circuit, the State of Maryland provides a
confidential communications privilege. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-105 (1974). Maryland's
adverse spousal testimony privilege models the Trammel rule. Id. § 9-106. North Carolina allows
spousal testimony for, but not against, the defendant spouse except for crimes by one spouse
against the other spouse, and no confidential communications are compellable. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-57 (1977). South Carolina provides no adverse spousal testimony privilege, but no
spouse may testify as to confidential marital communications. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30
(Law Co-op. 1976). In Virginia, courts may compel a spouse to testify for, but not against, the
defendant spouse, but courts allow adverse spousal testimony when a spouse commits a crime
against the other spouse or the couple's child. See VA. CODE § 8.01-398 (1950). West Virginia
provides a confidential communications privilege. See W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4 (1966). In addition,
West Virginia provides an adverse spousal testimony privilege except in cases of crimes against
a spouse or the couple's child. Id. § 57-3-3.
88. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47; see supra note 44 and accompanying text (federal courts
accorded flexibility in developing rules of evidence on case-by-case basis in light of reason and
experience); supra text accompanying note 75 (Hawkins Court allowed for future development
of marital privileges); Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 143 (Trammel
Court's decision predicated upon Hawkins and rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which
extend to federal courts authority to develop the marital privileges in "light of reason and
experience").
89. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47; see Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop:
Privileges- Their Nature and Operation, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 442, 444 (1983) (intent of Congress
in enacting Rule 501 was to provide flexible rules of evidence).
90. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50; see Graham, supra note 3, at 34 (ascertainment of truth is
goal of evidentiary rules).
91. Id.; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (all testimonial privileges
block road to truth); see also United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1984) (Supreme
Court in Nixon held that courts must construe privileges narrowly); United States v. Neal, 743
F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1984); (Nixon Court warned that privileges should be held suspect,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1848 (1985); United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1381 (5th Cir.)
(Nixon cautioned that courts must narrowly construe privileges), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988
(1978); Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena of Clay, 603 F. Supp. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (federal
courts narrowly apply adverse spousal privilege); Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena of Jean Ford,
no. M 11-188, slip op. at (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1985) (available Feb. 8, 1986, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file) (adverse spousal testimony privilege is disfavored and narrowly
construed in federal courts), aff'd 756 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1985).
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that precedent alone did not justify the absolute testimonial privilege. 92 The
Court, however, stopped short of abolishing the testimonial privilege and
reaffirmed the privilege's modem justification of preserving marital har-
mony.93
The marital privileges should not be abolished. 94 The privileges are
judicial constructs evolving over centuries, 95 and federal courts have the
authority and the responsibility to continue the development of the marital
privileges.96 The post-Trammel adverse spousal testimony privilege still serves
the common-law rationale of preventing marital dissension and fostering
marital harmony only when the marriage encourages solace and affection
between the spouses. 97 Similarly, the current confidential communications
92. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 49 (when precedent is only support for legal theory, that theory
must be eliminated) (quoting Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black,
J., dissenting)); see id. at 52 (basis for allowing defendant spouse to hush testimony of his wife
is outmoded because courts no longer deny women separate legal identity); see also supra note
24 and accompanying text (women gain separate legal existence).
93. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
94. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 86 at 173 (2d ed. 1972) (Supreme Court erred in omitting
commtrnications privilege from Rule 505) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMAICK]; Testimonial
Privilege, supra note 24, at 915 (Supreme Court should modify marital privileges but leave
abolition to the Congress); Note, Pillow Talk, Grimgribbers and Connubial Bliss: The Marital
Communications Privilege, 56 IND. L. J. 121, 139 (1980) (marital privileges should not be
eradicated) [hereinafter cited as Pillow Talk]; Privilege After Trammel, supra note 1, at 357
(abolition of privilege should be left to legislature).
95. Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985); see United States v. Lefkowitz, 618
F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir.) (marital privileges have no constitutional underpinnings), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980); Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 122 (marital privileges
not found in United States Constitution); Purdy, supra note 33, at 310 (marital privileges
founded in common law and have no constitutional justification). But see Krattenmaker, supra
note 31, at 647-48 (penumbra of right to privacy include protection of marital privileges);
Reutlinger, supra note 20, at 1370-71 (freedom to engage in private marital communications
guaranteed by constitutional right to privacy); Pillow Talk, supra note 94, at 141 (United States
Constitution does not specifically delineate marital privileges, but privileges related to right to
privacy under Fourth Amendment); Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 729-30 (some courts hold
confidential communications guaranteed by Fourth Amendment as right to personal privacy).
96. See United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978) (federal courts
have responsibility to reexamine common law justifications of marital privileges and to modify
privileges according to "reason and experience"), aff'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980);
United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal courts have responsibility
to examine underlying rationale of common-law privileges); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d
1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975) (federal courts possess the right and should exercise responsibility to
modify common-law privileges according to "reason and experience"). The Supreme Court in
Trammel explained that Congress intended to allow and encourage federal courts to continue
the development of the marital privileges in enacting Federal Rule of evidence 501. Trammel,
445 U.S. at 47 n.8. But see 583 F.2d at 1172 (McKay, J., dissenting) (appellate courts have
modified marital privileges, but changes should be made by Supreme Court or Congress).
97. See Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 1980) (Trammel held that adverse
spousal testimony privilege still supported by common-law principle of preventing marital
dissension). In allowing into evidence the voluntary adverse spousal testimony, the United States
Supreme Court in Trammel vitiated the common-law justification of "natural repugnance."
See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussion of common-law justification of adverse
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privilege achieves the common-law justification of preserving confidence and
intimacy in marital communications only when a trusting bond between the
spouses exists.98 Courts, therefore, should apply the joint participation
exception when applicable to either marital privilege, even if the court must
compel a witness spouse's testimony, if implementation of the marital
privileges would not serve the common-law rationales." Appellate courts,
however, disagree as to the continued validity of the joint participation
exception to the marital privileges.100
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United
States v. Van Drunen, 10' defined an occasion in which the kind of trust in a
marriage worth preserving exists.' 2 In Van Drunen, the government indicted
the defendant for knowingly transporting an alien into the United States. 0 3
The defendant subsequently married the alien and asserted the adverse
spousal testimony privilege to prevent the defendant's wife from testifying
against the defendant.' °4 The Seventh Circuit denied defendant the adverse
spousal testimony privilege stating that "collusive marriages" do not warrant
the protection of the privilege. 05 The Van Drunen court explained that
spousal testimony privilege). Since Trammel stated that courts should not compel involuntary
spousal testimony, the Court in Trammel eradicated the offensiveness of compulsion. Reutlinger,
supra note 20, at 1384-85 (society less likely to be offended if testimony is voluntary); Privilege
After Trammel, supra note 1, at 367 (same). Unlike the rationale for preserving marital
harmony, the common-law rationale of "natural repugnance" had no foundation in logic or
policy. MCCORMCK, supra note 94 at § 86, 176; WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 2228, 216. On
the contrary, the "natural repugnance" felt in digging into marital privacy by exposing marital
conversations rested on sentiment. McCoRMICK, supra note 94, at § 86, 173; Wtomoan, supra
note 5, at § 2228, 217. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1025,
1028 (2d. Cir.) (present rationale for adverse spousal testimony privilege is promotion of marital
harmony and natural repugnance for compelling witness spouse to testify), vacated as moot,
United States v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 84-1922); United States
v. Venuti, no. 84 CR 1002, slip op. at -(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1985) (available Feb. 8, 1986,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (natural repugnancy for condemning defendant spouse with
testimony of witness spouse still viable rationale for adverse spousal testimony privilege).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40 (discussion of confidential communications
privilege rationale).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 157-63 (courts should use marital privileges only in
support of privileges' rationales).
100. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussion of appellate treatment of joint
participation exception).
101. 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
102. Id. at 1397; see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
103. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d at 1394.
104. Id. at 1394, 1397. Since United States v. Van Drunen occurred before Trammel, the
analysis would be different if the case were tried today, but the holding would be the same.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 n.5 (2d Cir.) (Trammel
obviated need for joint participation exception as to adverse spousal testimony privilege), vacated
as moot, United States v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 84-1922).
105. See Van Drunen, 501 F.2d at 1397 (collusive marriage is marriage procured only to
prevent spouse from testifying); United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983)
(testimony concerning joint criminal acts of spouses not privileged in order to avoid criminal
acts of spouses not privileged in order to avoid collusive marriages); see also Lutwak v. United
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defendant's marriage did not contain the rehabilitative aspect that worthwhile
marriages possess.',6 The rehabilitative aspect that the Seventh Circuit men-
tioned in Van Drunen is indicative of a situation in which the marriage
rocked by the criminal activity of one's spouse is still worth preserving, since
the marriage still provides comfort, solace, and tranquility for the spouses. 0 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena United States,05 claimed that the Seventh Circuit's
rehabilitative argument in Van Drunen was invalid since the rehabilitative
aspect of the marriage upon the spouses was not a facet of the common-law
justification of adverse spousal testimony privilege.' 9 The Second Circuit,
therefore, reasoned that a marriage's retaining no rehabilitative aspect does
not warrant the imposition of the joint participation exception to the adverse
spousal testimony privilege." 0 In Grand Jury Subpoena, the defendant
spouses were involved in an alleged conspiracy to leak national defense
secrets to a foreign government."' The wife refused to testify before the
grand jury investigation concerning the defendant husband's indictment.,
2
The wife asserted the adverse spousal testimony privilege, believing that her
testimony might implicate the husband. "' The lower court jailed the wife
for contempt of court." 4 The Second Circuit stated that the Supreme Court
in Trammel undermined the Seventh's Circuit's argument in Van Drunen
that preservation of family harmony does not justify the recruitment of a
spouse for criminal activity.' '1 The Second Circuit explained that after
Trammel, a person seeking the help of one's spouse in criminal activity could
States, 344 U.S. 604, 607, 614-15 (1953) (Supreme Court ruled that spouses entering sham
marriages not privileged to withhold testimony against ostensible spouse). In Lutwak, the
spouses entered the marriage for the sole purpose of gaining illegal entry into the United States.
Id. The spouses were not to live together, but were to break the marriage bonds upon entry
into the United States. Id. at 607.
106. See Van Drunen, 501 F.2d at 1397 (marriage may have rehabilitative effect on
defendant spouse); see also Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980) (marriage
might have rehabilitative, "restraining" effect and might facilitate defendant's re-entry into
society).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 161-63 (discussion of Van Drunen's rehabilitative
aspect).
108. 755 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, United States v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185
(U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 84-1922).
109. 1d. at 1026.
110. Id. The Second Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States also argued that
if the Supreme Court approved the joint participation exception, the Court would have stated
so in Trammel. Id.
111. Id. at 1022-23.
112. Id. at 1023.
113. See id. at 1023, 1025 (confidential marital communications not at issue in Grand Jury
Subpoena).
114. The United States released defendant husband Karl and wife Hana Koecher with others
in exchange for Russian dissident Anatoly Scharansky on February 12, 1986. Scharansky Is Released
In Berlin, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1986, at 1, col. 1. The United States Supreme Court initially
had granted certiorari to hear the Second Circuit case. United States v. Koecher, 106 S. Ct. 56
(1985). Upon the Koecher's release, the Supreme Court vacated the case as moot. United States
v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (Feb. 25, 1986). Id. at 1023.
115. Id. at 1026.
[Vol. 43:197
FEDERAL MARITIAL PRIVILEGE
not be sure that the spouse would not testify voluntarily against that person." , 6
Furthermore, the Second Circuit refused to implement the joint participation
exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege and thus compel the
witness spouse to testify.
' 7
The Second Circuit in Grand Jury Subpoena correctly applied the adverse
spousal testimony privilege since the wife demonstrated an unflinching
devotion and loyalty to the husband."18 When no rehabilitative aspects remain
in a marriage, however, the marriage is not worth protecting since the
marriage offers no harmony, tranquility, or sanctity to the spouses. For
example, in United States v. Neal, ,,9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that the confidential communications privilege did
not protect the conversations by which the witness spouse learned of the
defendant spouse's crime. 20 In Neal, defendant appealed an earlier conviction
of felony murder.' 2' The defendant's wife did not participate in the robbery,
but the wife was an accessory after the fact to the robbery and subject to
prosecution. 22 The defendant's wife implicated defendant through testimony
revealing marital communications. 23 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling, which admitted the wife's voluntary testimony through invo-
cation of the joint participation exception to the confidential communications
privilege. 24 The Tenth Circuit explained that marital communications in
furtherance of a joint participation crime did not warrant protection by the
confidential communications privilege and the subsequent withholding of
relevant testimony because the communications privilege would not serve the
common-law rationale of encouraging marital privacy and confidence. ' 5
Implicit in the Neal court's reasoning is that criminal conversations contribute
nothing to a marriage.' 26 The Tenth Circuit, however, stated that when the
witness spouse learns of defendant spouse's criminal activity only through
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1028.
118. See id. at 1025 (wife stated she would rather die in jail than offer adverse testimony
against husband); infra text accompanying note 162 (Second Circuit mistaken in that rehabili-
tative aspect has no common-law roots, but Second Circuit achieved common-law rationale by
applying adverse spousal privilege to protect worthy marriage).
119. 743 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1848 (1985).
120. Id. at 1446.
121. Id. at 1442.
122. Id. at 1444.
123. Id. at 1442.
124. Id. at 1444-45.
125. See id. at 1446 (while witness spouse did not participate in commission of crime, she
actively and knowingly enjoyed fruits of robbery); cf. United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d
1373, 1381 (5th Cir.) (marital conversations pertaining to joint criminal venture not protected
by confidential communications privilege), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); Graham, supra
note 3, at 38 (confidential communications privilege did not protect marital conversations
pertaining to joint criminal venture); Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 753 (confidential
communications between spouses during criminal activity are not marital communications).
126. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1445; see supra text accompanying note 7 (discussion of "partnership
in crime"). The Neal court echoed Judge Hand's reasoning in stating that when husband and
wife commit a joint venture crime, the spouses form a "partnership in crime." Neal, 743 F.2d
at 1446.
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private marital communications and the witness spouse neither participates
in the fruits of the crime nor acts to cover-up the crime, the communications
privilege would prevent the admission of confidential marital communica-
tions. 27 The Neal court, therefore, silently endorsed the Van Drunen reha-
bilitative argument in encouraging spouses to be frank and open with one
another. 128
Criticism of the joint participation exception manifests itself primarily
in an unwillingness to pass on an issue not ratified by Congress or the United
States Supreme Court. 29 The Supreme Court has not considered the appli-
cation of the joint participation exception to the confidential communications
privilege.' 30 Additionally, courts refusing to grant the joint participation
exception to the marital privileges fail to find that the ascertainment of truth
outweighs marital privacy and the withholding of marital communications
from admission into evidence.'' For example, a concurring opinion in Neal
claimed that the joint participation exception should not apply to the
confidential communications privilege.'3 2 In Neal, the concurring opinion
reasoned that appellate courts are not free to abolish or modify what the
127. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1446.
128. See Id. at 1446; United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir.) (common-law
rationale for confidential communications privilege encourages spouses to be frank and open
with one another), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533 (1985).
129. See Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980) (as long as no federal or
state law calls for use of joint participation exception to adverse spousal testimony privilege,
courts should not use rules of evidence to impose exception).
130. See Partners in Crime, supra note 69, at 724-25 (no Supreme Court precedent
exists concerning joint participation exception as applied to confidential communications); see
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1028 (2d Cir.) (preferring to
allow Congress or Supreme Court to countenance joint participation exception), vacated as moot,
United States v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 84-1922).
131. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980) (public has right to hear all
evidence, but marital privileges allowed only when public welfare of maintaining privilege
outweighs admission of evidence); Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 17 (1934) (courts should
only allow invocation of marital privileges when courts cannot preserve common law rationales
of privileges in another manner); WioMoRE, supra note 5, at § 2332, 642 (courts must find that
harm to marriage resulting from revelation of spousal communications at trial exceeds benefit
of communications as testimony in ascertainment of truth in order to allow marital privileges).
Courts wisely utilize a balancing test to avoid preserving a tenuous marriage at the expense of
justice. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 698 (3d Cir.) (when negative effect
on familial harmony insignificant, balancing test mandates admission of testimony), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1015 (1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981) (courts
must balance public's right to hear evidence against effect of spousal testimony on marriage),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir.
1978) (allowing joint participation exception against adverse spousal testimony privilege because
evidentiary needs outweighed policy of fostering family harmony through implementation of
testimonial privilege), aff'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); United States v. Mendoza,
574 F.2d 1373, 1381 (5th Cir.) (courts must balance countervailing forces of preservation of
familial sanctity against ascertainment of truth and realization of justice), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
988 (1978).
132. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1984) (Logan, J., concurring), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1848 (1985).
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Supreme Court has recognized since Trammel.'3 In addition, the concurrence
explained that no persuasive evidence warranting modification of the confi-
dential communications privilege exists 34 and that the joint participation
exception will tempt the prosecution to threaten the witness spouse3 5 or will
tempt a vindictive spouse to lie or exaggerate.
3 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Appeal of
Malfitano'37 criticized the invocation of the joint participation exception to
the marital privileges by examining the privileges' foundation.3 , The Malfi-
tano court refused to honor the joint participation exception to the adverse
spousal testimony privilege and to compel the witness spouse to testify against
the defendant spouse. 3 9 In Malfitano, a married couple engaged in a
conspiracy involving bribery and collusion.14' The district court disallowed
the implementation of the adverse spousal testimony privilege. 14' The Third
Circuit overruled the district court's decision and granted defendant the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony, reasoning that criminal marriages
are not necessarily beyond salvation. 42 The Malfitano court explained that
the adverse spousal testimony privilege is designed to preserve marriages, not
to disturb already unstable marriages, and that courts should not evaluate
the social utility of marriages.'43 Furthermore, the Third Circuit noted that
the testimonial privilege is designed to protect marriages from the debilitating
impact of adverse spousal testimony. '4 Since the joint participation exception
would render a marriage vulnerable to the detrimental impact of adverse
testimony, the Malfitano court concluded that the exception would vitiate
the very principles the testimonial privilege is supposed to protect. 45
The Third Circuit again addressed the joint participation exception to
133. Id. at 1448. But see supra text accompanying note 96 (federal courts have right and
responsibility to modify common-law testimonial privileges).
134. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1448. But see infra text accompanying notes 155-58 (communications
privilege should protect only those marriages worth preserving).
135. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1448; see Lempert, supra note 1, at 734 (courts should not use joint
participation exception because exception gives prosecution incentive to splinter marriages); see
also supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussion of witness spouse's voluntariness to
testify).
136. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1448; see Krattenmaker, supra note 31, at 655 (revelation of private
marital conversations might induce witness spouse to lie owing to natural inclination to protect
loved ones).
137. 633 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
138. Id. at 277-78.
139. Id. at 278.
140. Id. at 276.
141. Id. at 277.
142. Id. at 278; see infra note 154 and accompanying text (courts evaluate social worth of
criminal marriages).
143. Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 278-79.
144. Id. at 279 n.5.
145. Id. at 279; In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1028 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, United States v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 84-1922).
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the marital privileges in United States v. Ammar. 46 In Ammar, the Third
Circuit heard an appeal from the defendant's conviction for conspiring to
import and distribute heroin. 47 The district court allowed the defendant's
wife to testify against the defendant, revealing private marital communica-
tions.' 48 The Third Circuit affirmed the district's court's holding by invoking
the joint participation exception to the confidential communications privi-
lege. 149 In examining the joint participation exception, the Ammar court
distinguished the two marital privileges.5 0 The Ammar court reaffirmed the
decision in Appeal of Malfitano, stating that the adverse spousal testimony
privilege protected the actual marriage on a broad front and emphasizing
that the joint participation exception belies the underlying rationale of the
testimonial privilege.' In contrast, however, the Ammar court noted that
the confidential communications privilege specifically protects marital com-
munications only.' 52 The Third Circuit, therefore, concluded that while the
marriage of joint criminal venturers might deserve protection from the
adverse spousal testimony privilege, the marital communications made during
the commission of a crime do not warrant protection from the confidential
communications privilege."' Underlying the Third Circuit's analysis is the
premise that the admission into evidence of voluntary testimony revealing
marital conversations pertaining to criminal activity does not have a negative
impact upon a marriage. 54 Furthermore, the Third Circuit implicitly held
that the willingness of a spouse to testify against his or her spouse was
indicative of a marriage not worth preserving.1
55
Marriages worth preserving through invocation of the marital privileges
and thus deserving protection from deleterious spousal testimony possess a
polarizing and centrifugal quality that binds the spouses and benefits social
146. 714 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
147. Id. at 243.
148. Id. at 251.
149. Id. at 258.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 145 (failure to apply testimonial privilege would
destroy underlying premise of privilege).
152. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 258; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d
1022, 1027 (2d Cir.) (communications privilege designed to protect only conversations), cert.
vacated as moot, United States v. Koecher, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 84-1922).
153. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 258. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Koecher, 601 F. Supp.
385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court applied joint participation exception against adverse spousal
testimony privilege and ordered witness spouse to testify), vacated, In re Grand Jury Subpoena
United States, 755 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 54 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986)
(No. 84-1922). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Koecher, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York stated that to allow the application of the joint participation
exception to the confidential communications privilege and not to the adverse spousal testimony
privilege was illogical. Id.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26 (criminal conversations not essential to
welfare of marriage).
155. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 258; see infra text accompanying note 163 (no marriage is worth
preserving if witness spouse is willing to help place defendant spouse in jail).
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welfare.1 6 In determining whether a marriage contains some measure of
comfort and trust, several courts have evaluated the social worth of mar-
riages. 57 Courts must make some evaluation as to the worth of a marriage
156. McCom.ncK, supra note 94, at § 86, 216; see Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74,
77 (1958) (underlying justification for adverse spousal testimonial privilege of fostering familial
tranquility benefits not only spouses and children but society in general); Medieval Philosophy,
supra note 3, at 319 (marital tranquility is crucial to modern society).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983) (deterring
recruitment of spouses as accomplices outweighs protection of marriage); United States v.
Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 396 (8th Cir.) (possible preservation of defendant's marriage through
exclusion of wife's testimony would not have outweighed search for truth at trial), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979); United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1978) (no family
harmony existed worth preserving nor outweighing need for evidence), aff'd on other grounds,
445 U.S. 40 (1980); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (even though
spouses legally married, marriage had deteriorated beyond point at which marital privilege could
offer protection); In re Ms. X, 562 F. Supp. 486, 488 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (evidentiary concerns
greater than possible preservation of tenuous marriage). But see United States v. Byrd, 750
F.2d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to require trial courts to determine worth of marriage
before attempting to preserve marriage through implementation of confidential communications
privilege); Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980) (courts cannot evaluate social
utility of marriages); Trammel, 483 F.2d at 1173 (McKay, J., dissenting) (majority's ruling is
unjust in that prosecutor may make independent judgment whether marriage is worth preserv-
ing); United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978) (court declined to make value
judgment whether defendant's marriage was worth preserving); United States v. Venuti, No. 84
CR 1002, slip op. at 4(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1985) (available Feb. 8, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (rejected inference that marriage destroyed because divorce proceedings
initiated since reconciliation still possible); Galban, supra note 14, at 188 (Trammel mistakenly
assumed that voluntary adverse testimony indicates deteriorated marriage); Testimonial Privilege,
supra note 24, at 912 (federal judges ought not evaluate worth of marriage); Privilege After,-
Trammel, supra note 1, at 367 (courts should avoid inquiries into worth of marriages). Federal
courts require that those wishing to invoke the marital privilege must have a valid marriage.
Graham, supra note 3, at 38; Development of Marital Privileges, supra note 23, at 123. Courts
construe invalid marriages as those marriages entered into for the sole purpose of reaping the
benefits of the marital privileges at trial. Id. at 124-25; see United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d
568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975) (defendant could not avail himself of adverse spousal testimony
privileges because defendant's marriage not procured in good faith); supra note 105 and
accompanying text (collusive marriage is not marriage based on love or trust, but rather an
attempt to defraud courts and reap benefits of marital privileges). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Appeal of Malfitano disfavored a court's assessing the value
of a particular marriage, but the Malfitano court conceded that courts must determine the
validity of the marriage. Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 278. In United States v. Byrd, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested that courts determine only whether spouses
are separated, not whether the spouses' marriage contains any social worth. United States v.
Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 1984). The Byrd court reasoned that the ascertainment of
truth at trial outweighed the interest in preserving the confidentiality of separated couples. Id.
at 593. In United States v. Fisher, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held the adverse spousal testimony privilege inapplicable when evidence overwhelmingly showed
a marriage beyond salvation. United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1033 (1975). The Second Circuit, therefore, did not endorse a judicial evaluation of a
marriage, deeming it inappropriate to delve into private marital concerns. Id. The Fisher holding
restricted the denial of the testimonial privilege to a situation in which no additional inquiry
was necessary beyond the threshold determination that the marriage was wrecked. Id.
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in order to determine whether protection of the spouse from adverse testi-
mony legitimizes preventing the admission of the evidence.5 8 The ascertain-
ment of truth at trial is more important than a judicial attempt to reconcile
a marriage already torn asunder by the spouses themselves. 59 The presence
of a rehabilitative aspect in a marriage reflects a marriage which common-
law courts designed the marital privileges to protect.'16 The Second Circuit
in In re Grand Judy Subpoena United States mistakenly construed the
rehabilitative feature of a particular marriage in claiming the effect had no
basis in the common-law rationale underlying the marital privileges.' 6' The
rehabilitative aspect discussed in Van Drunen is imbedded firmly in the
common-law justification of fostering family tranquility and preventing
marital dissension. When a couple invests trust and confidence in a marriage,
the marriage exudes harmony and tranquility. Through the common-law
evolution of the marital privileges, courts designed the privileges to foster
trust, honesty, openness, and peace of mind. 62
The Trammel rule achieves the purpose of the adverse spousal testimony
privilege by preserving those marriages worth saving by admitting voluntary
adverse spousal testimony and withholding involuntary adverse spousal tes-
timony when some family harmony, mutual spousal trust, and marital
tranquility exists. 63 The Court in Trammel stated that courts should not
compel an unwilling witness spouse to testify. 64 The Trammel Court, how-
ever, did not envisualize a scenario in which the witness spouse refused to
testify and the marriage lacked the qualities the adverse spousal testimony
privilege purports to protect. The Trammel Court stated that the purpose of
the modern adverse spousal testimony privilege was to encourage marital
harmony and tranquility. 65 Courts should compel a witness spouse's testi-
mony only when no marital harmony worth preserving exists. 66 Not com-
pelling involuntary testimony when the marriage possesses no redeeming
rehabilitative aspects would not utilize the adverse spousal testimony privilege
158. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 2228, 216.
159. MCCORMICK, supra note 94, at § 86, 173; WIoMORE, supra note 5, at § 2228, 216.
160. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussion of rehabilitative aspect).
161. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussion of Grand Jury Subpoena
holding and rehabilitative aspect).
162. MCCORMICK, supra note 94, at § 86, 173; WiaMoRE, supra note 5, at § 2332, 642;
United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 593 (7th Cir. 1984).
163. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980); MCCORMICK, supra note 94,
at § 86, 173; WIGMOPE, supra note 5, at § 2228, 216; see supra note 79 and accompanying text
(Trammel rule does not invite prosecution to splinter marriage, but better serves common law
rationale of preserving marital harmony).
164. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
165. Id. at 44.
166. See Krattenmaker, supra note 31, at 655 (compulsion of spousal testimony not
inconsistent with common law rationales of marital privileges if evidentiary needs predominant,
but court should restrict scope of disclosure); Testimonial Privileges, supra note 24, at 911
n.138 (stricter standards of admission of evidence into court could protect spouses from
unnecessary disclosure of private marital matters if court employs joint participation exception).
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in the manner the common-law courts intended, or for the purpose the
Trammel Court acknowledged. 67 Courts, therefore, should implement the
joint participation exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege when
a married couple commits a crime together and the couple's marriage is not
worth preserving. In a situation in which an accused confides in his spouse
the nature of the accused's criminal activity, however, courts should protect
and encourage the trust manifested in the accused's turning to his spouse
for comfort and understanding. The common-law justification of fostering
marital privacy through invocation of the confidential communications priv-
ilege encourages spouses to be frank and open with one another.'" Courts,
therefore, should not penalize a defendant for seeking solace in defendant's
marriage partner by revealing his conscience. When the witness spouse offers
voluntary testimony against the defendant spouse, however, the marriage is
not worth preserving. 69 Furthermore, in a joint participation crime, courts
should not invoke the confidential communications privilege and thus en-
courage or sanction a defendant's recruitment of the defendant's spouse as
an accomplice unable to testify as to the criminal activity.' 70 The kind of
trust or comaraderie between partners in crime is different than the trust or
confidence between spouses.' 7 ' The communications privilege intends to
protect the affection and confidence in marriages. 72 The communications
privilege should not encourage the recruitment of a spouse as a criminal
accomplice.173 Thus, when a marriage possesses no characteristics such as
confidence, trust, openness, or frankness, courts should not invoke the
communications privilege and prevent ostensibly damaging statements from
admission into evidence at trial.1'v Courts should also apply the joint partici-
167. See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussion of adverse spousal testimony privilege
rationale).
168. United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533
(1985).
169. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980); see Wyatt v. United States, 362
U.S. 525, 534 (1960) (Warren, C. J., dissenting) (when spouse refuses to testify against other
spouse, courts probably should protect marriage); McCoRmcK, supra note 94, at § 66, 145
(same); United States v. Venuti, No. 84 CR 1002, slip op. at .. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1985)
(available Feb. 8, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (witness spouse's unwillingness to
testify against defendant spouse reflects marital harmony worth protecting). But see United
States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 1984) (confidential communications privilege applies
even when witness spouse's testimony is voluntary). In Byrd, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that the confidential communications privilege
does not apply to a disintegrated marriage. Byrd, 750 F.2d at 592.
170. WiouoRE, supra note 5, at § 2228, 216.
171. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussion of Judge Learned Hand's phrase
"partnership in crime").
172. See text accompanying note 40 (discussion of communications privilege rationale).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 (discussion of rationale of confidential
communications privilege).
174. MCCORMICK, supra note 94, at § 86, 173; WIOMORE, supra note 5, at § 2332, 642.
But see WHARToN's, supra note 31, at § 562, 99 (courts cannot compel or allow spouse to
testify if defendant spouse asserts confidential communications privilege); In re Grand Jury
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pation exception to the confidential communications privilege because the
rationale of the communications privilege does not protect the confidences
of criminals. In the absence of some marital trust, the evidentiary needs in
the ascertainment of truth warrant the compulsion of spousal testimony
regarding confidential marital communications. 75
In deciding whether to compel involuntary spousal testimony, courts
must determine whether the marriage deserves the protection of the marital
privileges.176 In evaluating whether a marriage is worth preserving, courts
should consider when the couple married,' 77 whether the spouses have
cohabited for an insubstantial period of time since the marriage, 78 whether
the spouses have lived with another person since marriage, 79 and whether
one spouse has threatened the other spouse not to testify.'8 0 If one or more
of the circumstances exist, courts should consider compelling involuntary
spousal testimony, since the existence of one of the circumstances would
indicate that the marriage does not possess the rehabilitative aspects that the
common-law courts designed the privileges to foster.
Before the commencement of the modern evolution of the marital
privileges,' 8' courts disqualified or declared incompetent a spouse's testimony
Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 789 (courts should not compel witness spouse to choose whether
to claim communications privilege and risk contempt of court or forego privilege and testify,
possibly breaching loyalty to defendant spouse).
175. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (balancing test for admission of testimony
requires substantial showing of harm to marriage before marital privileges allowed to hamper
ascertainment of truth). But see Testimonial Privilege, supra note 24, at 917 (harm to marriage
difficult to prove whereas probative value of evidence easier to show).
176. See supra text accompanying note 162 (marriages worth preserving possess rehabili-
tative aspects).
177. See United States v. Apodaca, 552 F.2d 568, 521 (10th Cir. 1975) (defendant spouse
not accorded adverse spousal testimony privilege because spouses' marrying three days before
trial indicated collusive marriage); supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussion and
definition of collusive marriage).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 593 (7th Cir. 1984) (confidential
communications privilege does not protect communications between separated spouses even if
communications intended to be confidential); United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 396 (8th
Cir.) (defendant husband left wife after two weeks of marriage and spouses did not see one
another between husband's leaving and trial), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); United States
v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (marital privileges inapplicable because spouses
did not cohabitate and saw each other very infrequently); United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d
836, 840 (2d Cir.) (adverse spousal testimony privilege not allowed since spouses had not lived
together for ten years), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); United States v. Venuti, No. 84 CR
1002, slip. op. at .. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1985) (available Feb. 8, 1986, on LEXIS Genfed
library, Dist file) (adverse spousal testimony privilege upheld on grounds that spouses still
married and cohabitated for one year prior to trial).
179. Cameron, 556 F.2d at 756 (husband lived with another woman and fathered child by
that woman); Fisher, 518 F.2d at 840 (defendant husband had two children by another woman).
180. United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975) (husband threatened wife
-not to testify, thus indicating that wife's testimony was voluntary).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (discussion of evolution of marital privileges).
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for or against a defendant spouse. 8 2 The United States Supreme Court,
however, eliminated common-law disqualification 3 and changed the ration-
ale of the confidential communications privilege from incompetency to the
modern justification of preserving marital intimacy and encouraging frank
and open marital relationships. 184 The Supreme Court finally vested the
adverse spousal testimony privilege in the witness spouse alone.' s8 While the
Trammel Court improved and clarified the application of the adverse spousal
testimony privilege, the Court did not consider the possibility that the
privilege might be used for a purpose for which the privilege was not
intended. 18 6 Federal courts have the right and the responsibility to modify
and thus continue the evolutionary development of the marital privileges.
8 7
If a marriage is not worth preserving, courts should compel the involuntary
testimony of a witness spouse since the attempted preservation of a moribund
marriage does not outweigh the public's right to hear all evidence in the
ascertainment of truth at trial.188 Similarly, courts should not protect private
marital communications through invocation of the confidential communica-
tions privilege when a marriage offers no intimacy or comfort to the spouses
and confidentiality would not benefit the deteriorated marriage.8 9 Courts,
therefore, should invoke the joint participation exception against either
marital privilege when the spouses engage in a joint criminal venture and the
privileges would not help preserve a worthwhile marriage.19
JEFFREY EUGENE JONES
182. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24 (discussion of incompetency and disqualifi-
cation).
183. See supra text accompanying note 53 (Funk abrogated common-law disqualification).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40 (discussion of communications privileges
rationale).
185. See supra text accompanying note 12 (Trammel modified the adverse spousal testimony
privilege).
186. See supra text accompanying note 167 (discussion of rehabilitative aspect).
187. See supra text accompanying note 96 (courts have power and duty to modify marital
privileges).
188. WIoGUOa, supra note 5, at § 2228, 216 (courts should not risk acquitting defendant
spouse by attempting to save moribund marriage).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 168-175 (discussion of confidential communications
privilege and privilege's underlying rationale).
190. See Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77 (if witness spouse compelled to testify, marriage suffers
less damage than if witness spouse voluntarily testified).
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